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A COLD WAR PRIMER

Global divisions during the "Cold War".

Global divisions during the “Cold War”.When was the Cold War era?

 

The precise period of the Cold War is difficult to limit since it cannot be linked to a particular starting and ending event. For ease of understanding we can define the Cold War as taking place between 1945 (the end of the Second World War) and 1991 (the collapse of the Soviet Union). It is important to note, however, that some historians argue, perhaps convincingly, that the Cold War era actually commenced in 1917 with the Bolshevik take-over of power in Russia. Other historians have argued that the Cold War commenced slightly later during the Allied War of Intervention in Russia in 1918 (when British, American and other “western” forces fought alongside the White Armies as anti-Bolshevik allies during the Russia Civil War).

  • What is meant by the term “the Cold War” as it is used by historians?

For the purposes of clarity in our studies this semester, the term “The Cold War” will be used to refer specifically to the tensions that existed between the Capitalist/Liberal Democratic world (led by the USA) and the Communist/Marxist-Leninist world (led by the USSR and to some extent China) in the post-1945 era.

  • How does a “cold war” differ from other wars?

Cold wars (generally) can be understood as periods of international tension and hostility between nations that fall short of actually breaking out in open, large-scale warfare between them.
The Cold War, therefore, was a period of confrontation between the post-1945 superpowers that never amounted to direct open warfare between them. Rather their confrontation was often by “proxy”, confined to “incidents” or other military, political or economic actions.

  • How do historians study the Cold War?

After consideration of key terms and issues of historiography, the Cold War is often studied through the use of incidents as case studies that give examples of the policies of the superpowers. A wide range of international “incidents” took place during the period and historians tend to choose from these numerous examples of tension to illustrate their perspectives on issues relating to the Cold War.

  • What is the historiography of the Cold War?

Historiography is essentially the study of the way that history is written. Effectively, historiography can be thought of as “the study of the study of history”. The Cold War period is an excellent time frame to consider in terms of historiography as historians studying the period have involved themselves a series of clearly articulated and documented debates regarding key issues of the period.
For example, historians argue as to the precise origins of the Cold War. Generally speaking, they offer three broadly differing perspectives as to the causes and responsibility for the tensions between the USA and the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1991. These three differing historical “schools” are known as the “orthodox”, “revisionist” and “post-revisionist” schools of thought and represent the three main perspectives offered by historians on the study of the Cold War.

Ashton, S. (1990). Living Through History: The Cold War. London: Batsford, pp 3-5

Ashton, S. (1990). Living Through History: The Cold War. London: Batsford, pp 3-5

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AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY: 1919 TO THE 1930S

Poster celebrating the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.

Poster celebrating the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.

According to Australian historian K.J. Mason, the major question involving Prime Minister William Morris Hughes at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 was the issue of Germany’s colony in New Guinea and other nearby possessions in the Pacific. Supporting his assertions with reference to primary source documents of the time, he emphasises the importance of Hughes’ belief that Australia should “annex” northern and eastern New Guinea to “ensure the future security of Australia. It was a belief shared by many” (Mason, 1985, p. 174). On this issue, the Australian government, led by “The Little Digger”, was to get its way. After the war, New Guinea became an Australian mandated C-class territory. At the conference, Australia, under Billy Hughes, had vigorously pushed for what it considered to be its own vital national security interests. Mason notes the way in which Hughes clashed repeatedly with those nations who challenged this expression of Australian “self-interest” in Foreign Policy. When the White Australia Policy was challenged by the USA and Japan at the conference as a treaty was drafted Australia was steadfast. No treaty would be signed by Australia which included a “racial equality clause”. As Britain remained silent on this issue, Hughes felt confident in pursuing and safeguarding those objectives which he believed to be in the best interests of Australia. Such a view reflects, and is representative of, many historians who have studied this period of Australian foreign policy.

This embryonic Australian independence of Foreign Policy would fade into the background of politics in the inter-war period. When Stanley Bruce replaced Hughes as Prime Minister in 1923, Australia’s international outlook would be shaped, once again, by a man who had “a deep respect for and confidence in the British system” of foreign policy. “Australia was once again prepared to allow Great Britain to direct the pattern of her international policy” (Mason, 1985, p.177). At a time where other Dominions (notably Canada and South Africa) were developing a more confident independent view of the world, Australia continued to follow a British lead. Throughout the 1920s, at a series of Imperial Conferences, a new relationship between Britain and her Dominions was forged. At one such conference in 1926, the Balfour Declaration, emphasised equality in legal standing between the “mother country” and her Dominions. It was agreed by all the Dominions that the all nations represented (including Australia) were “independent communities equal in status and united by a common allegiance to the Crown”. This was the birth of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Five years later, in 1931, the Statute of Westminster legislated this understanding. The British Parliament, through this act, “gave up all powers over the Dominions”. Mason highlights the dependency of Australian foreign policy at this time by making comparisons to Canadian, South African and Irish policy at the time. As these nations eagerly embraced the newfound independence, mason points out that “it was not until 1942 that the Australian parliament finally ratified (formally accepted) the Statute of Westminster” (Mason, 1985, p.177).

Mason sees the 1920s as a period bereft of “independent or effective foreign policy” in Australia (1985, p.181). He clearly points out that Australia at that time was “content to follow the British lead” and to reflect British international priorities and objectives. He argues that not until 1937 was any sense of Australian foreign policy divergence identifiable. Australians, he believed, “adopted an almost negative attitude to world affairs” (1985, p.181). When Japan invaded the provinces of northern China in 1931, Mason points out that Australia was unable and unwilling to follow anything other than the British view expressed in the League of Nations. “Australia’s voice was inexperienced and ineffective. Australia condemned the Japanese invasion and then, like the rest of the world, did nothing” (Mason, 1985, pp.177-178). When Italy invaded Abyssinia in 1935, Australia did little more. Supporting a British lead, however, on this occasion, Australia imposed some punitive sanctions on Italy. Following a British lead, these sanctions were lifted in 1936.

1937, according to Mason, became a significant year in Australian foreign policy as the government “took a rare initiative in foreign policy” (1985, p.178). Such a view is representative of the position taken by other historians such as MacIntyre (1995), Hoepper (1991) and Cowie (1989). Acknowledging the danger Japan posed to Australian security when its army pushed south into China, Mason points out that Australia (under Prime Minister Joseph Lyons) proposed a non-aggression pact for the nations of the Pacific. Lyons, with the support of the British government, began a series of meetings in London with representatives from Japan, Russia, the USA and China. Despite his efforts, the pact was never concluded. Mason surmises:

For the Far East, and for China and Japan in particular, the idea of non-aggression had come too late. But the proposal for such an alliance was the first real expression of an independent Australian foreign policy. (1985, p.178)

From 1937, the Australian government supported the now discredited British policy of appeasement towards Hitler. In 1938, both the conservative United Australia Party (UAP) government and the Australian Labour Party opposition supported the British government’s settlement with Hitler over Czechoslovakia. In 1939, the Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies (who succeeded the leadership after the death of Lyons), in step with the British government, would finally accept the failure of appeasement and declare war on Germany in full accordance with Britain’s views. “There was never any doubt as to where Great Britain stood, and neither is there any doubt where Great Britain stands there stands the people of the entire British world” (Menzies in Mason, 1985, p.179). Clearly in the eyes of Menzies (and Mason), Australia was, in 1939, still very much a part of the British world.

Bibliography:

Mason, K.J. (1985) Experience of Nationhood: Australia and the World Since 1900, McGraw Hill: Sydney.

GOING TO WAR IN VIETNAM

A Divided Vietnam.

A Divided Vietnam.

When Vietnam split into North and South after the withdrawal of the French during 1954, thousands of covert Viet Minh cadres remained in place in the villages, towns and cities of the south. Despite the increasing tensions between the North (under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi) and South (under the corrupt leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem in Saigon), these cadres were ordered by the North Vietnamese leadership to focus their attention on political activities in preparation for the 1956 elections as agreed to by the Geneva Accords rather than military activities. Despite some low level insurgency breaking out (in the form of assassination of low level south Vietnamese political leaders), this remained largely the situation until the 1956 elections failed to take place. As this reality became apparent, these communist-aligned cadres became increasingly active militarily and began to work against the southern government who were faced with other civil unrest. In 1956, the government controlled press in Saigon began to refer to communist agitators in the south as the Viet Cong – a shortening of the phrase Viet Nam Cong-San which meant Vietnamese Communist. In the face of this communist threat, the United States sent its first military advisors and trainers to the south. This small force of American troops would grow over the next two decades. In 1958, the Viet Cong began its first military attacks upon the government of the south (now known officially as the Republic of Vietnam or more commonly South Vietnam). By 1959, the north Vietnamese government (since 1954 known officially as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) had become increasingly involved in the reinforcement and supply of the southern communist-led insurgency. In September 1959, troops of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) were ambushed by a significant force of Viet Cong. From that time, a state of civil war openly existed in Vietnam. Similar fighting continued throughout 1960 and, as John Fitzgerald Kennedy (JFK) was elected to replace President Dwight Eisenhower in the USA, Diem faced not only threats to his power from the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese but also from his own military who staged a coup attempt.

In January 1961, the Kennedy Doctrine was announced as JFK was inaugurated. The doctrine signalled a willingness on the part of the USA to take firm military action in order to contain communism and, in this context, the out-going President (Eisenhower) warned the young Kennedy of his fear that American troops would need to be deployed to South East Asia. By May 1961, Vice-President Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ) had visited Diem in Saigon. By November, the first significant contingent of US special forces arrived in Vietnam to assist the ARVN. In December 1961, the first US soldier (a cryptologist) was killed in an engagement with the Viet Cong. Throughout 1962 and 1963, the conflict between the North and South increased in intensity with American forces becoming increasingly involved in the fighting to support the ARVN. By the time of Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963, there were over 16,000 US troops in South Vietnam, the first contingent of Australian Army advisors had arrived in the country and an ARVN military coup (with the support of the American CIA) had overthrown Diem in Saigon. By mid-1964, a second military coup had taken place in Saigon and the USA under President Johnson seemed increasingly willing to directly intervene in the war with the use of US troops. In August 1964, the stage seemed set for an expansion of the war.

In August 1964, two naval events involving the US destroyers USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy led to an expansion of the US involvement in the war. Referred to by historians as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, the two incidents gave the Johnson administration a justification for increasing America’s military intervention in Vietnam. On August 2nd 1964, the USS Maddox was carrying out electronic surveillance of North Vietnam inside waters claimed by North Vietnam as their territory in the Gulf of Tonkin. (This presence was designed in part to ‘test’ North Vietnam’s resolve in facing the US and coincided with South Vietnamese coastal raids on border regions of the North.) At approximately 3pm, the Maddox was approached by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats and an engagement took place resulting in the sinking of one torpedo boat and heavy damage to another. The Maddox then withdrew to South Vietnamese waters and reported the incident. On August 4th, the Maddox with another ship (the Turner Joy) returned to the area within North Vietnamese waters. In heavy seas during night-time, the ships reported further attack by torpedo boats and fired upon “radar targets”. Within 30 minutes of the August 4th attacks, President Johnson had decided on retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam. (It is important to note however that while sonar reports from the Maddox indicated that torpedos had been fired at the US ships, within 24 hours, the US military had itself questioned the accuracy of these reports[1].)

Using the attacks on the Maddox as justification, President Johnson addressed the US public by radio shortly before midnight US time on August 4th positioning the North Vietnamese as aggressors against the USA. On August 5th, Johnson called upon both houses of US Congress to authorise the use of American power to “assist free nations” to “defend freedom”. On August 7th 1964, the US Congress passed a Joint Resolution which effectively authorised the US President (Johnson) to act in any way necessary to support signatories to the SEATO alliance. (The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed unanimously in the US House of Representatives and with only 2 votes against in the US Senate.) The resolution has been interpreted as in effect an American declaration of war in Vietnam. The resolution legitimated US involvement in the war and the escalation of the war in Vietnam can be dated from the resolution.

[1] The commander of the Maddox was eager to report to his superiors (including Defense Secretary Robert McNamara) that he had no evidence that the ships had come under attack on August 4th. The officer in charge felt that a combination of bad weather and an over-zealous sonar-man had led to false reports of an attack. McNamara himself felt there was a great deal of confusion on the ships on August 4th 1964 while Johnson in 1965 privately commented that the US navy may have been “shooting at whales” for all he knew. The North Vietnamese military commander at the time, General Giap, stated in 1995 that no attack had actually taken place. Recently declassified documents demonstrate the sensitivity of the issue at the time.

AUSTRALIA AND THE COLD WAR: Some Possible Reasons for Entering the Vietnam Conflict

Next Course, Please!” cartoon relating to Australia’s fears of Asian communist expansion as it appeared in Catholic News Weekly (21 July 1954) in Anderson, M. (2009). Chapter 6: Politics, Power and Protest in the Vietnam War Era. Retrieved July 20, 2012, from Scribd.com: http://www.scribd.com/doc/36889002/2977874-Retro-Active-2, p.162

Next Course, Please!” cartoon relating to Australia’s fears of Asian communist expansion as it appeared in Catholic News Weekly (21 July 1954) in Anderson, M. (2009). Chapter 6: Politics, Power and Protest in the Vietnam War Era. Retrieved July 20, 2012, from Scribd.com: http://www.scribd.com/doc/36889002/2977874-Retro-Active-2, p.162

One of the significant historical debates in Australia concerns the reasons why Australia entered into a conflict in Vietnam. This debate has links to the historiography of the Cold War itself. When considering Australia’s reasons for entering a war in Vietnam alongside the USA during the 1960s, it’s necessary to consider a variety of perspectives.

Broadly speaking, when considering reasons for Australia’s entry into the Vietnam War, historians have pointed to a number of inter-related factors. These factors include:

 A historical undercurrent of fear within Australia of Asia

  • Deep roots to Australian fears of Asia and Asians are found in Australian history. Fears of China / Chinese were common throughout the 19th century while these were (to some extent) replaced by fears of Japan during the early decades of the 20th century. It is easy to draw links between these fears and an Australian xenophobia and racism.
  • The Japanese threat to Australia during World War 2 and later the rise of Chinese Communism in 1949 would seem to give substance to these fears in the minds of many Australians.
  • This fear during the 1950s and 1960s was coupled with a fear of Communist expansion as expressed by Orthodox historians of the Cold War (who pointed to the Korean War as an example of the threat of Asian communism).
  • A fear of Asian Communism proved a particular concern to some in Australia during the 1950s and 1960s. This concern was often exploited for political purposes in the 1950s and 1960s in Australia.

A desire within Australia to demonstrate Australia’s support for a nation that had the ability  act as a “great and powerful friend” should Australia’s security be threatened.

  • Traditionally, Australia had looked with confidence to the protection offered by our relationship with Britain. Until 1941-2, Australians had felt secure in the belief that, should Australia ever face the threat of attack or invasion by a nation in Asia, the power of the British Empire (in particular, its navy) would be there to defend and protect Australia.
  • Some historians suggest that during the period prior to 1941-2, successive Australian governments had sent Australian troops into overseas conflicts as a way of demonstrating Australia’s continuing loyalty to Britain in the hope that this loyalty would be reciprocated by Britain should Australian security ever be under threat. In a sense Australia’s commitment of forces in the cause of Britain was seen as “paying dues” for an Australian national “insurance policy”.
  • In World War 2, Australian belief in Britain’s ability/desire to protect Australia was shaken as the Japanese swept aside British military power in the region to Australia’s near north.
  • In 1941-2, Australia’s relationship with the USA grew much closer and the US replaced Britain as a “great and powerful” protector and military ally against the Japanese. Some historians suggest that to Australian governments, the USA had simply replaced Britain as a “protector” and that the “insurance policy” had been transferred to a new protector to whom new dues would need to be paid.
  • This relationship continued into the post-war period and was formalised with the signing of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951 (during the Korean War and within the context of the Cold War.
  • The “insurance policy” perspective on Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War is used by many historians and revisionists use it as a way of criticising governments for their perceived lack of independence in Australian foreign policy. It is sometimes suggested that Australia was led “blindly” into the Vietnam War by those who emphasised closeness to the USA with little consideration of the possible costs involved.

 Australia’s involvement in Cold War alliances with the USA.

  • Growing out of the above points, Australia had entered into two significant alliances with the USA during the Cold War era.
  • Both alliances, to a greater or lesser extent, were linked to America’s policy of containing communist expansion as expressed in the Truman and Kennedy Doctrines.Many Australians were also gravely concerned by the Domino Theory (first expressed by US President Eisenhower in 1954) which suggested that a chain reaction of communist expansion may take place in South East Asia unless communist nations were “contained”.
  • The two alliances effecting Australia often linked to US containment policies are: (1)  The ANZUS Pact/Treaty (between Australia, New Zealand and the United States) signed in 1951. (2)  SEATO. (The South East Asian Treaty Organisation, created as an instrument of containment, and signed in 1954. The organisation listed both Australia and the USA as members – alongside other nations – and, significantly, granted protection to the Republic of South Vietnam.)

U.S. COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY – CONTAINMENT

1966 Liberal Party Election Poster in Nichols, T. (Ed.). (2010, November 4). North Vietnam: As bad as we thought, and worse. Retrieved July 22, 2012, from The War Room: http://tomnichols.net/blog/2011/11/04/north-vietnam-as-bad-as-we-thought-and-worse/

1966 Liberal Party Election Poster in Nichols, T. (Ed.). (2010, November 4). North Vietnam: As bad as we thought, and worse. Retrieved July 22, 2012, from The War Room: http://tomnichols.net/blog/2011/11/04/north-vietnam-as-bad-as-we-thought-and-worse/

Regardless of the underlying causes of the Cold War and the differing perspectives offered by orthodox, revisionist and post-revisionist historians, it is important to develop an understanding of the stated foreign policy and stated motivations of the USA

Because so many modern historians argue that Australia “followed” the USA into the Vietnam conflict during the 1960s as a result of fears of Asian communism and out of a desire to prove loyalty to the alliances formed with America, it is important to consider the US policies towards the communist bloc which influenced its decision-making during the Vietnam era (the 1950s – 1970s).

 

Throughout the Cold War, American foreign policy towards the USSR (and other communist nations such as China) was characterised by a perceived need to defend itself and its allies against the threat of communist expansion (as envisaged by Marx and Trotsky – notably not by Stalin). The leaders of the USA repeatedly articulated a commitment to assisting and supporting like-minded and supposedly “liberal-democratic” states against any perceived left-wing threats. Some critics have gone so far as to argue that US foreign policy during the Cold War period until 1991 can, at its worst, be interpreted as an American willingness to support any regime as long as it was anti-communist – even if it were clearly authoritarian and undemocratic!

 

What is clear, however, is that US foreign policy during the Vietnam era can be explored by examining a series of phases in which a variety of approaches are taken in dealing with the perceived communist threat posed by the USSR and the People’s Republic of China. Underlying each of these phases is a clear desire to CONTAIN communism within its present boundaries. Each phase seems to have developed its own nuances that have been captured in the speeches and “doctrines” of policy leaders – especially those of three key Presidents.

 

PHASE 1: 1947 – 1961

 

TRUMAN DOCTRINE (named after President Harry S. Truman)

 

Sub-theme: The Domino Theory (President Eisenhower, 1954)

The creation of Containment as a principle in US Foreign Policy during the early years of the Cold War largely prior to Australian and American involvement in Vietnam..

 

“I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting the attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures… If we falter… we may endanger the peace of the world – and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.” (Truman, 1947)

 

Associated with a growing American commitment to containing communism in a variety of locations including Vietnam after 1954. According to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, containment was of particular importance in Asia where the threat of communist expansion was expressed in the Domino Theory.

 

 

 

PHASE 2:

1961 – 1970

 

KENNEDY DOCTRINE (named after President John F. Kennedy)

 

 

A continuation of the objective of Containment but couched in far more “robust” and “assertive” terms than the Truman Doctrine.

 

“Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill… that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” (Kennedy, 1961)

 

Initially associated with the events of the Cuban revolution (1959) and subsequent Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), the doctrine represented an escalation of America’s commitment to containing communism in a variety of locations including Vietnam after 1961.

 

After Kennedy’s assassination in 1962, his doctrine remained central to the policies of his successor, President Lyndon B. Johnson. LBJ is remembered for his escalation of the Vietnam conflict.

 

 

 

 

 

PHASE 3:

1970/3 – 1977

 

NIXON DOCTRINE (named after President Richard M. Nixon)

Containment is placed “in context”. America states a willingness to support others rather than become directly involved in warfare.

 

“Abroad and at home the key… lies in the placing and the division of responsibilities. The time has passed when America will make every other nation’s conflict our own, or make every other nation’s future our responsibility, or presume to tell the people of other nations how to manage their affairs. Just as we respect the right of each nation to determine its own future, we also recognise the responsibility of each nation to secure its own future.” (Nixon, 1969)

 

Associated with the end of the Vietnam War (early 1970s) and the concept of Vietnamisation (1969), the doctrine was announced in a context of American desires to withdraw from the Vietnam War.

 

 

 

 

 

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